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Abstract 
Studies of NASA mishaps often reveal a flawed 
decision-making process – one that underestimates 
risk. In this paper we turn our attention from the risk 
itself to uncertainty about the risk. In particular, we 
look at how decision-making accounts for uncertainties 
about a risk’s likelihood of occurring and the 
consequence if it does occur. We propose a simple way 
of classifying risks according to these uncertainties. 
Then we use this classification scheme to gain insight 
into the flawed decision-making that contributed to the 
Challenger disaster and other NASA mishaps as well. 
We show how our risk classification scheme can 
improve decision-making and help avoid mishaps in 
the future. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
In our study of NASA mishaps, we found a 
recurring pattern of flawed decision-making [1]. 
Decision-makers often mis-estimated one or more risks 
to the mission. There were many reasons for this error, 
including overconfidence, cognitive bias, and 
groupthink [1]. The results were poor quality decisions 
that, in some cases, led to the loss of missions and even 
human life [1], [2], [3]. 
In this paper, we turn our attention from how 
decision-makers mis-estimate risk to how they fail to 
account for uncertainty in risk parameters. 
Traditionally, risk is defined as: 
 
Risk = (Likelihood of Occurrence) x (Consequence) 
 
Where Likelihood is typically expressed as a 
probability (i.e., a number between 0 and 1), and 
Consequence is the magnitude of the loss experienced 
if the risk is realized (often expressed as a dollar 
amount) [4]. 
In this paper, we examine the case where decision-
makers estimate the Likelihood and Consequence, but 
don’t take into account the uncertainties embodied in 
these estimates. We show that incorrectly handling the 
uncertainties can lead to poor quality decisions. We 
take examples from the domain of earth and space 
exploration to show how this has contributed to mission 
failure.  
We then propose a mitigation for this problem: a 
simple scheme for classifying risks that gives decision-
makers a way to think about and incorporate important 
information about risk uncertainties into their 
decisions. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we 
will describe the motivation for our study and why we 
chose to examine data from NASA mishaps. In Section 
3, we look briefly at related work and approaches taken 
in the past. In Section 4, we examine the fateful 
decision to launch the Challenger Space Shuttle in 
detail, as an example of decision-makers not 
accounting for Likelihood uncertainties. We then 
briefly survey other NASA mishaps where similar 
mishandling of risk uncertainties may have contributed 
to mission failure. In Section 5, we propose a simple 
model for classifying risks according to the 
uncertainties in Likelihood and Consequence. In 
Section 6, we show how to use this model in the 
decision-making process. In Section 7, we show how 
this approach could have been applied in our 
Challenger example. In Section 8, we briefly examine 
how our model could be applied to other NASA 
mishaps. Finally, in Section 9, we conclude with a 
summary of the research contribution, the limitations of 
our study, and the potential for future work. 
 
2. Background and Context 
 
Our examination of decision-making, risk, and 
uncertainty is motivated by trying to improve the odds 
of success for earth and space missions. In NASA 
tradition, this is often accomplished by analyzing past 
failures and deriving lessons learned [5]. 
This particular study started from our personal 
observations of how risks are handled in the 
development of earth and space science missions. As 
mentioned earlier, we noticed that risks are often 
incorporated into decision-making, but uncertainties 
about those risks are often not considered. 
The reason is that risk is often seen as falling in one 
of two categories: 1) as “known” risks, where there is 
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no need to account for uncertainty or 2) as “unknown” 
risks, where there is no ability to account for the 
uncertainty. In both cases, the uncertainty is not 
directly used in the decision calculation itself. 
We have experienced review meetings where risks 
were identified, discussed, and assessed – after which, 
the reviewers credited themselves for doing risk-
informed decision making – and adjourned.  
We have also witnessed what happens when 
decision-makers disagree on risk assessment. 
Sometimes this led to an arbitrary decision (e.g., 
“splitting the difference” between the two opinions for 
the sake of concession). On other occasions, it led to 
ignoring the risk in the decision altogether, because it 
was “unknowable”. 
We questioned whether these decision practices took 
place on NASA missions that experienced mishaps, 
whether these practices contributed to the mishaps, and 
if so, what could be done about it. We sought the 
answers in focused study of NASA mishap reports and 
detailed studies, as are available for the largest failures, 
such as Challenger and Columbia [6], [7]. 
 
3. Related work 
 
There is an extensive literature on risk and 
uncertainty in decision making. Of interest for this 
study are those that discuss schemes for classifying 
uncertainty that can be used in decision making. For 
example, one scheme of classifying uncertainty comes 
from the economist Frank Knight, who distinguished 
between uncertainty for which a probability distribution 
is known and that for which one is unknown or 
unmeasurable (“Knightian Uncertainty”) [8]. 
Another, albeit informal, scheme for classifying 
uncertainty involves what we know and “what we 
know we know” (e.g., things we know we know, things 
we know we don’t know, things we don’t know we 
don’t know) [9]. Oddly, we have found many 
discussions of this four-quadrant scheme, though the 
approach is more philosophical than for practical use in 
decision-making [10]. Our classification scheme, 
described below in Section 5, bears a surface 
resemblance to this typology, but it is designed 
specifically for use in decision analysis. 
Since we are using examples from the domain of 
NASA missions, it is important to understand NASA’s 
standards for risk and decision making. Two key 
documents are the Agency Risk Management 
Procedural Requirements [11] and the NASA Risk 
Informed Decision Making (RIDM) Handbook [12], 
which offers more detailed guidance. The RIDM 
handbook reminds decision makers that “decisions are 
made taking into account applicable risks and 
uncertainties” and that “complete assessment of [risk] 
likelihood also calls for characterization of its 
uncertainty” [12]. This is sound advice, and the 
sections below will provide additional details on 
motivation (through mishap analysis) and method 
(through a proposed model of risk uncertainty). 
In addition, this study makes use of NASA mishap 
reports [13], [14], [15], [16], [17], [18], [19], [20]. It 
also draws on some of the larger, independent studies 
of the tragic Challenger and Columbia shuttle accidents 
[2], [3], [21], [22]. Decisions that contribute to mishaps 
are sometimes well-described, sometimes inferred in 
the smaller reports, whereas decision-making is an 
important theme in the major works on the shuttle 
disasters. This is especially true for the Challenger 
launch decision [2] 
 
 
4. The Challenger Example 
 
At the heart of the Challenger launch decision was 
uncertainty about the risk that O-rings – rubber seals on 
the Challenger’s fuel tank – would fail catastrophically. 
The O-rings in the booster rockets on the space shuttle 
were designed to expand when heated, in order to seal 
different chambers of the rocket, so that the solid rocket 
fuel would not be ignited prematurely. According to 
engineering specifications, the O-rings must expand by 
some amount, say at least 5%, to ensure a safe launch. 
When an O-ring does not expand by at least this 
amount there is a risk of a “blowout” failure where fuel 
leaks out and may ignite outside the booster shell and 
very likely to cascade into an explosion. This was 
estimated to occur 1 out of 1000 times if the expansion 
is less than 5% [23]. 
O-ring degradation during flight was a known risk. 
What was unknown was the relationship between 
temperature and O-ring degradation. The scatterplot, 
below, shows data on the number of O-rings that failed 
to expand more than 5% (an “incident”) and the 
temperature at launch [23]. 
 
 
Figure 1 – O-Ring failures vs. temperature 
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There were only 24 data points, and none that 
extended to the temperature on the launch-pad on the 
morning of the launch. Therefore, the decision makers 
had to extrapolate the results for an as-yet untested 
temperature. They used the linear regression curve 
shown as the diagonal line in Figure 1. The following 
analysis is only loosely based on the account of what 
transpired. We describe a variation on the analysis 
performed to better illustrate the risk-classification 
issues involved. However, the resulting 
misclassification of risk would be the same if we 
followed the analysis actually performed. 
According to the linear regression model, there is a 
highly significant negative linear relationship between 
temperature and number of incidents (p-value less than 
0.001). At the time of the launch decision the ambient 
temperature was 9 degrees Fahrenheit, giving a 95% 
prediction interval of between 4 and 18 O-ring 
incidents– would be expected. From a safety 
perspective, they might have even used a 99.99999% 
confidence level and calculated a extremely confident 
worst case of 38 O-ring incidents [24].  
This leads to an “extremely confident worst case” 
failure probability of: 
 
P = one blowout per 38 incidents = 0.03634 
 
This is less than 4%, which given their 5% 
threshold, placed them within their margin of safety. 
Under this analysis, the decision to launch the 
Challenger is justified. 
However, their analysis does not fully account for 
the uncertainty about the relationship between O-ring 
incidents and low temperatures, for which 
measurements weren’t available. To obtain the number 
of incidents at the low temperatures, they relied on 
linear regression. The uncertainty not accounted for is 
the uncertainty in linear extrapolation to a temperature 
well outside the range supported by the data.  
In fact, we easily see that a linear model is not 
appropriate: a normal Q-Q plot of residuals (a plot of 
the differences between the observed and predicted 
values) should not produce a high, outlier value (e.g., 
greater than 3 std errs). Figure 2 shows the Q-Q plot for 
this linear regression: 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – Use the linear model? 
 
The point with 11 incidents at 53 degrees is clearly a 
major outlier (more than 3 std errs) in the linear model. 
In addition, the plot is non-linear indicating that the 
Normality assumption for linear regression is dubious, 
further rendering uncertainty about the validity of the 
extrapolated prediction interval.  It turns out that a 
power-law model of the following form would have 
been a better fit and a more justifiable worst case 
extrapolation: 
 
N = aT^b 
 
Where N is the number of O-ring incidents and a 
and b are constants determined by the best fit to the 
data. Under this model, temperature was also highly 
significant (p-value about 0.001) and no residual 
outliers. We calculated N=113 expected incidents at 29 
degrees giving a probability of a blowout of 0.1061, or 
about 11% -- well over the safety margin! This does not 
account for the variability, especially from 
extrapolation. Considering the 95% prediction interval 
here would give a worst-case of 1689 incidents with a 
.82 probability of a blow out! In this characterization of 
the uncertainty in extrapolation the decision would 
decidedly be not to launch. The point to consider here 
is, given the uncertainty in how to appropriately 
extrapolate to a temperature not supported by the data, 
why did they settle on the clearly more optimistic 
assessment of blowout risk? Feynman in the Challenger 
disaster result suggested it was a case of acclimation 
bias [22]. By better understanding the source of 
uncertainty and how it affects decision making, such 
biases perhaps could be reduced.    
It’s interesting to ask how low the temperature could 
go for the result to be within the 5% safety margin. 
Figure 3 is a plot of the predicted number of blowouts 
(y-axis) at each temperature (x-axis). The solid black 
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curve shows the most likely number and the upper red 
curve shows the maximum number within a 95% 
confidence interval. For reference, the lower red curve 
shows where the 95% confidence range fell in the 
linear model actually used by the decision makers. The 
5% safety margin is indicated by the dotted line: 
 
Figure 3 – Blowouts vs. temperature 
 
Figure 3 shows that the number of predicted 
blowouts crosses the safety-margin at about 35 degrees, 
and the curve representing 95% confidence crosses at 
about 49 degrees. The difference from the linear model 
is striking. At the actual temperature of 29 degrees, the 
decision using the power model would be “don’t 
launch!”  
As mentioned previously this discussion is not an 
account of the analysis performed. Apparently, they did 
use a simple linear model, but only using only data 
when there was an O-ring incident. Their regression 
analysis conclusion was there was is significant 
relationship between temperature and increased O-ring 
incidents. They extrapolated by assuming there is no 
relationship at lower temperatures outside the range of 
data for the model and concluding that the simple 1 in a 
1000 chance of blowout was the risk and it was 
acceptable to launch. But the critical point is not the 
different results given by different models. It’s in how 
the models were compensating for uncertainty that was 
not acknowledged by the decision makers. The models 
were used to extrapolate from a small sample of 
measurements, to estimate the likelihood of a 
catastrophic blowout at the real temperature, which lay 
outside the range of their sample. 
The decision makers had no O-ring test data to 
support the confident expectation of a successful 
launch in such cold conditions. Engineers who worked 
on the Shuttle delivered a biting analysis: “We're only 
qualified to 40° F. No one was even thinking of 18° F. 
We were in no man's land.” [24] The Rogers 
Commission did an extensive review of the Challenger 
disaster. They found NASA’s decision-making 
processes among the contributing factors to the 
accident [6]. In retrospect, there was plenty of 
understanding and discussion of the uncertainties 
present and the risk they presented. 
The question for us is how to model such risk 
uncertainties, to bring them out of the shadows so to 
speak, to make them part of the decision-making 
process, as should have been done with the 
uncertainties surrounding the O-ring risk on the 
Challenger. 
 
5. Modeling Risk Uncertainties  
 
Risk has two dimensions: Likelihood and 
Consequence. Therefore, the simplest way to account 
for risk uncertainty is to determine whether 1) the 
risk’s Likelihood is known or unknown and 2) whether 
the risk’s Consequence is known or unknown. Since 
Likelihood is a probability measure, a known 
Likelihood means being able to assign a probability to 
it. A known consequence means being able to assign 
the magnitude of a loss to it (e.g., assign a dollar value 
for its cost). 
Thus, we define a classification quadrant of 
(known Likelihood, known Consequence), (known 
Likelihood, unknown Consequence), (unknown 
Likelihood, known Consequence), and (unknown 
Likelihood, unknown Consequence), abbreviated as 
KK, KU, UK, and UU as shown in Figure 4: 
 
 
 
Figure 4 – Risk uncertainty quadrant 
 
  To illustrate this, consider how we would classify 
the risk of betting on the flip of a coin: 
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1. KK – if the coin is fair and the bet is $1 in 
advance 
2. UK – if the coin has an unknown bias and the 
bet is $1 in advance 
3. KU – if the coin is fair, but the bet is set by 
the opponent while the coin is in mid-flip 
4. UU – if the coin has an unknown bias, and the 
bet is set by the opponent while the coin is in 
mid-flip 
 
As you can see, this method makes the uncertainty 
in risk factors explicit. The main reason for doing this 
is to address a second-order risk -- or “decision risk” -- 
that appears when there is uncertainty in the risk 
factors.  Decision risk relates to how confident we are 
that the decision is the correct one. Without taking 
decision risk into account, it is almost inevitable that 
decision-makers will fall prey to natural biases and 
become overconfident in the correctness of the 
decision [25]. 
For example, if we didn’t know there was a bias in 
a coin flip we were betting on, we would assume it was 
a fair 50-50 bet. In fact, what we are doing is treating 
an unknown known (UK) as a known known (KK). 
The result is that we are incorrectly assessing our risk: 
we are overconfident in a decision made using an 
incorrect assumption. We are taking on more risk than 
we accounted for, since we are not accounting for 
decision risk. 
In the next section, we discuss how to use this 
model to recognize and incorporate decision risk into 
the decision process. 
 
6. Using Classification in the Decision Process 
 
The benefit of our risk classification model is that 
the strategy for handling decision risk is different for 
each of our four quadrants. If the risk uncertainty is 
KK, the expected outcome of the decision is simply 
Likelihood x Consequence, a multiplication of two 
known quantities.  The decision strategy would be the 
classic one, in which you can compute the expected 
benefit or loss for each decision option.  In our coin 
flip example, the expected risk exposure for both heads 
and tails is $1 x 0.5 (even odds) = $0.50.  
In the other three quadrants, we are confronting 
uncertainty and hence, decision risk. Classifying risk as 
UK, KU, or UU guides you towards assessing the 
uncertainty you have in either (or both) Likelihood or 
Consequence, and determining how this uncertainty 
factors into the decision. 
One of the implications of classification is that 
decision-makers need to consider their risk posture 
before they can analyze the risk. They need to make it 
explicit whether they are primarily benefit-seeking or 
risk-avoiding. If risk-avoiding, then they need to 
determine how uncertainty affects the worst case for 
risk. If benefit-seeking, then the decision makers need 
to determine how uncertainty affects the best case. 
What is the upper bound on the expected loss? What is 
the lower bound on the expected gain? Can we 
calculate a Value at Risk (VaR) for the decision? That 
is, we should be able to assert, “We have a 95% 
confidence level that our loss will not exceed this 
value.” 
Classifying risk as UK, KU, or UU opens up the 
possibility of an additional option to consider: the best 
choice may be to reduce the uncertainty first, before 
making the final decision.  Decision-makers often 
don’t consider this option. As we’ll show in Section 8, 
below, we found this to be a factor in several NASA 
mishaps. 
Reducing uncertainty typically takes different 
forms when dealing with Likelihood (UK/UU) or 
Consequence (KU/UU). Likelihood uncertainties are 
usually reduced by obtaining more information, for 
example, by running more tests or performing more 
detailed analysis. Consequence uncertainties may 
involve intervening in the system itself, for example 
creating redundancy to lower the impact of losing a 
critical sub-system. Buying insurance, where possible, 
is another strategy for reducing uncertainty in 
Consequence. 
Let’s look at the KK, UK, and UU strategies for 
our example of betting on the flip of a coin. For 
unknown Likelihood (UK/UU), we might lower our 
bet for a number of rounds while we learn more about 
possible bias in the coin, using Bayesian statistics. For 
unknown Consequence (KU/UU) we may negotiate 
with our opponent to put a limit on the size of the bet – 
or pay a third party to “insure” against our losses. 
This brings us back to the Challenger launch 
decision. How did the decision-makers handle the 
uncertainty? How should they have classified the risk? 
And what difference could it have made? 
 
 
7. Challenger Revisited – with the Model 
 
In terms of our risk classification scheme, the 
Challenger decision-makers treated the O-ring risk as 
though it were KK, known Likelihood and 
Consequence.  
We agree that the Consequence was known. 
Everyone involved with the launch decision knew that 
an O-ring blowout would lead to a catastrophic failure. 
Burning gases would ignite the fuel tank and cause the 
horrific explosion we saw when Challenger launched.  
However, we think the O-ring risk should be 
classified as UK. The decision-makers were not 
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accounting for uncertainty in the Likelihood. As we 
discussed in Section 4, they didn’t have test data for 
the actual temperature during launch. The data they did 
have could be extrapolated using various models that 
gave conflicting results (differences in the linear vs. 
power-law model discussed above).  
Treating the risk as UK might have made a 
difference in the decision. Being conscious of the 
uncertainty, the engineers may have run their 
extrapolation through the more conservative, power-
law model, which would have made a stronger case for 
a no-launch decision.  
But more importantly, it might have led the 
decision-makers to the strategy for UK risks that we 
proposed in Section 5. It would have guided them to 
consider the worst-case risk, given the uncertainty, and 
then to delay the launch and buy down the uncertainty 
with more testing the O-rings at low temperatures. 
 
8. Other Mishap Examples 
 
Challenger is an excellent example of how 
misclassifying risk uncertainty can lead to bad 
decision-making and mission failure. But it’s important 
to verify that this pattern applies to a broader range of 
mission mishaps.  
In an earlier study, we examined a set of ten 
NASA mishaps, taking place from 1986 to 2013 and 
ranging in impact from the loss of life down to being 
only a “close call” [1]. These are shown in Table 1: 
 
Year Mishap Mission  Loss 
1986 Challenger Shuttle Life 
1990 Hubble Telescope Recover 
1999 Mars Climate Orbiter Orbiter Mission 
1999 Mars Polar Lander Lander Mission 
2003 Columbia Shuttle Life 
2004 Genesis Sample Return Recover 
2004 Helios Drone Mission 
2005 Dart Earth Orbiter Mission 
2010 Compton Telescope Balloon Mission 
2013 Helmet Water Space walk Close 
 
Table 1 – Set of NASA Mishaps (1986-2013)  
 
Reviewing these mishaps, we found that for over 
half of them, an uncertainty surrounding an important 
risk was mis-classified – and this contributed to the 
mishap. For example, the Columbia shuttle mission 
handled the risk of its fuel-tank foam insulation falling 
off as a known known (KK). They thought the 
consequences were known: they knew foam fell off 
during testing and even other shuttle flights, without 
damaging results. In fact, this risk should have been 
classified as known unknown (KU), since the 
consequences were uncertain. Foam falling off and 
striking the shuttle at high speed ultimately led to its 
destruction [7]. 
We saw a similar pattern in the “Helmet Water” 
close call. Mission operations treated the risk of a 
leaky tube in the astronaut’s helmet as a known known 
(KK), since the tubes were known to leak on occasion 
and the consequence had so-far been minimal. In fact, 
the risk should have been classified known unknown 
(KU). There was uncertainty in the consequence, and 
during one space-walk, leaks from the tube caused an 
astronaut’s helmet to fill up with water. Fortunately, he 
made it safely back to the shuttle – and thus the mishap 
was a “close call” [20] 
In another example, developers of the Hubble 
space telescope mirror seemed only aware of known 
known (KK) risks. However, uncertainties about the 
quality of the Hubble mirror were actually in the 
unknown unknown (UU) category. This would have 
suggested the strategy of “buying-down” the 
uncertainty through additional quality assurance, which 
in turn might have led to the discovery of the mission-
crippling Hubble mirror flaw before its launch [13].  
A similar classification and change in decision 
strategy also seemed to apply to the Mars Climate 
Orbiter (MCO). The project knew there was something 
amiss with the spacecraft trajectory. Treating it as an 
unknown, unknown (UU) risk and buying down the 
uncertainty with additional tests might have helped 
them find the cause – mixing “miles” and “kilometers” 
in their navigation calculations -- prior to the failed 
orbit insertion maneuver [14]. 
 
 
9. Conclusion 
 
In this study, we suggested the importance for 
decision-makers to properly account for the 
uncertainties surrounding risks. We analyzed the 
Challenger launch decision as an example, showing 
how the decision-makers mis-handled uncertainty in 
the Likelihood of an O-ring blowout at low 
temperatures, and how this led to a flawed decision to 
launch. We showed that a similar pattern could be 
found in other NASA mishaps, as well. 
We proposed a new risk classification scheme 
based on uncertainties about risk Likelihood and 
Consequence; and we presented decision strategies for 
each of our four risk uncertainty classifications. We 
applied our classification scheme and the resulting 
decision strategy to the Challenger launch decision and 
discussed its application to other NASA mishaps.  
 
8.1. Contribution and Future Work 
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The contributions of this research include: a new 
framework for classifying risk uncertainties, strategies 
for using the classification scheme, and its application 
to decision-making under risk and uncertainty. This 
research also contributed to a greater understanding of 
the decision-making errors that contributed to the 
Challenger disaster and other NASA mishaps. 
Future work includes a broader application of this 
framework to decision-making in other high-risk 
domains, for example medicine or public safety.  
Another potential application is to risk 
management standards and practices.  For example, the 
NASA Risk Informed Decision Making Handbook 
advises mission decision-makers to “take uncertainty 
under consideration” – but doesn’t provide a method 
for doing so [12]. Using the framework and decision 
strategies presented here, risk standards could offer 
concrete guidance in this area. 
Ultimately, the goal of this and related research 
remains one of learning the lessons of past mishaps, 
adjusting our standards and practices accordingly, and 
steadily improving our odds of mission success. 
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